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Abstract
Network intrusions leverage vulnerable hosts as stepping stone to penetrate deeper
into a network and mask malicious actions from detection. This research focuses on a
novel active watermark technique using Discrete Wavelet Transformations to mark and
detect interactive network sessions. This technique is scalable, nearly invisible and
resilient to multi-flow attacks. The watermark is simulatedusing extracted timestamps
from the CAIDA 2009 dataset and replicated in a live environmet.
The simulation results demonstrate that the technique accur tely detects the presence
of a watermark at a 5% False Positive and False Negative rate for both the extracted
timestamps as well as the empirical tcplib distribution. The watermark extraction accuracy
is approximately 92%.
The live experiment is implemented using the Amazon ElasticCompute Cloud (EC2)
service. The client system sends marked and unmarked packets from California to
Virginia using stepping stones in Tokyo, Ireland and Oregon. Five trials are conducted in
which the system sends three simultaneous watermarked samples and one unmarked
sample 100 times to each target. The live experiment resultsare imilar to the simulation
and provide statistical evidence demonstrating the eff ctiveness in a live environment to
identify stepping stones.
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Scalable Wavelet-based Active Network Stepping Stone Detection
1 Introduction and Motivation
1.1 Background
Presently, malicious users are a serious problem in the computing industry. Computer
and network attacks (i.e., data exfiltration and botnets) continue to grow at an alarming
rate. Intrusion detection is a diverse area of interest focused mainly on preventing these
attacks. Identifying the origin of the attacks and mapping the route is important to prevent
future attempts. A 2008 report shows that most of the attack attempts on US computers
originated in the US as shown in Figure 1.1 [17]. As stated by asecurity researcher at
Secureworks,
”We believe these statistics are significant because it clearly shows that
the United States and China have a lot of vulnerable computersthat have been
compromised and are being used as bots to launch cyber attacks.”
One important element is detecting computerst pping stones. A stepping stone is a
computer that is actively used as a hop point, normally inside the targeted network. It
communicates with external and internal computers using bi-directional network streams.
Indeed, stepping stone detection is important because the malicious actors circumvent
many of the security measures (e.g., firewalls or other network barriers). By having full
access to a single host, the malicious actions appear as legitimate traffic and is difficult to
detect.
Recent work by Houmansadr shows that watermarking inter-packet delays in packet
streams is one of the most powerful tools in detecting stepping stones [10] [8]. The
1
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Figure 1.1: 2008 origins of US cyber attack attempts by country [17]
watermark serves as a recognizable pattern that serves as a mrking for the network
stepping stones. The Scalable Watermark that is Invisible and Resilient to Packet
Losses (SWIRL) system watermarks the inter-packet delays to detect the network streams.
This active technique adjusts the packet delays so that fewer packets are required for
detection and is generally more accurate than related passive techniques. The general
system model in Figure 1.2 shows the network components as well as the watermarker
and detector. Placed on the edge of the network, the watermarker modifies the packet
timing as they enter or leave the network boundary. If one of the network computers is
used as a stepping stone, a detector placed inside the network can detect the watermarked
stream from the internal network.
Previously captured streams of SSH traffic and empirical distributions included in the
tcplib library builds the model of typical stepping stone traffic. Consistent with related
2
research for stepping stone detection, passive data collected by the Cooperative
Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) project forms the main resource for
previously captured SSH streams.
Figure 1.2: System Block Diagram
It is important to note that stepping stone detection techniques must be robust against
attackers attempting to subvert detection. Attackers use chaffing as well as introduce
random jitter into the packet streams to circumvent detection. Indeed, the technique must
3
be difficult for an attacker to detect and resilient against watermark removal. The
watermark must be invisible so that it is difficult for an attacker to determine if the stream
is indeed watermarked. The proposed technique presents a novel method of the stepping
stone detection and presents the results of the simulation and live experiment.
1.2 Problem Definition and Goal
This research introduces a novel algorithm for detecting network stepping stones.
The algorithm uses a semi-blind active watermarking technique that modifies the
inter-packet delays in a way that is nearly invisible (i.e.,the presence of a watermark is not
apparent to the attacker). The goal is to demonstrate effectiveness of identifying network
stepping stones using this technique. In addition, the system must scale to facilitate
integration in larger network environments. The final goal is predictable error and
detection rates that are comparable to previous research.
1.3 Approach
The technique is developed based on the statistics of extracted traces from the
CAIDA 2009 dataset. Next, the procedure is simulated and tested to compare performance
from previous research and accepted statistical distributions. Once the algorithm is refined
and evaluated, a live system using stepping stones is implemented that tests the
performance in a real-world environment. A comparison betwe n the simulation and the
live experiment demonstrates the performance and effectiveness of this novel technique.
1.4 Research Contributions
This research serves to introduce and evaluate a technique to detect stepping stones in
a network. If applied in a real-world environment, this system can assist network security
personnel in identifying malicious network streams, combatting botnets and preventing
data exfiltration.
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1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
The main assumptions and limitations in this research involve three areas. The first
involves the limitation that the extracted timestamps fromthe CAIDA 2009 SSH ports do
not contain payload information and therefore are not guaranteed to be interactive
sessions. These extracted timestamps are assumed to be a valid representation of typical
interactive sessions.
The second area involves the selection of stepping stones for the experiment. A true
valid sampling requires a random selection of true network stepping stones from the
complete population. Because this is not feasible, the stepping stones selected in the
experimental phase represent hosts that exhibit similar chra teristics to likely stepping
stones. It is assumed in this research that the results may beextended to a larger scale
based on the fact that the selected stepping stones are a valid sample of the available
stepping stones.
Lastly, because this research focuses on interactive stepping stones, the algorithm
performance decreases when the type of traffic is changed. The performance specifically
deteriorates during high rates of traffic as well as constant rate traffic. Although the
algorithm could be adapted to these distributions, this research focuses mainly on the
distribution associated with human driven interactive sessions. As a result, automated
sessions are not within the scope of this research, however efforts to extend this technique
may focus on applying the wavelet technique to these sessions.
1.6 Thesis Organization
This thesis presents the research in a manner typical of experimental research. First,
the background addresses previous research relating to this field. Next, the experimental
methodology and the analysis are presented. Conclusions follow the results addressing the
impacts of the research and discusses future work. The appendices include a discussion on
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the development of the client and server programs as well as aisting of rejected CAIDA
datasets.
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2 History and Background
This chapter introduces many of the techniques evaluated inprevious related
research. Stepping stone detection traces back approximately ten years ago in 1995 when
Staniford-Chen and Heberlein recognized the problem and proposed an initial solution
[20]. Since then, attackers progressed in complexity making the detection of stepping
stones more difficult. As the attackers’ techniques became more advanced to cloak their
actions, the detection methods also became more complex to adapt to these changes.
Advantages and disadvantages of previous techniques are discussed in this chapter to set
the stage for the proposed technique for stepping stone detection.
First, the importance of detecting the stepping stones is discussed followed by a brief
discussion of malicious and legitimate uses of stepping stones. Next, a classification of the
current detection techniques are presented as passive and active methods along with blind
and non-blind detection. Finally, a summary of the history and previous research is
presented.
2.1 Why Stepping Stones are Important
2.1.1 Evolution of Stepping Stones.The problem of intruders gaining access to
computer systems through the network traces back many yearsand continually presents a
difficult problem in today’s growing networks. In 1995, Staniford-Chen and Heberlein
introduced the problem of tracing an intruder back through ac ain of multiple machines.
These chains are often referred to as stepping stones and detecting them is commonly
known as Stepping Stone Detection (SSD) [20]. The chains provide anonymity to the
attacker so that tracing the original source of an attack is more difficult. Because an
attacker may have access to only one host due to security or network restrictions, using a
stepping stone allows the attacker to extend the reach of theat ack using this one
compromised machine.
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Fifteen years later this same problem still exists and as thecomplexity of the attacker
increases, this problem is more difficult to solve. Data streams are more complex due to
the use of encryption, data padding or chaffing and timing perturbations. The encryption
schemes hides the contents of the data from both eavesdropping or sniffing. In many cases,
even the victim stepping stone cannot read the data althoughit traverses the link. Data
padding or chaffing involves the attacker inserting extra data into the useful data stream.
Chaffing is a practice in cryptography that adds packets of data thaappear legitimate but
are only discernible to the receiver with the correct key. The c affing process is commonly
used to maintain confidentiality without actually encrypting the data, but requires
significant overhead to mask the original contents of the data. Because many applications
can be identified by the inter-arrival time of the packets (e.g. most Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) calls), the actual packet times may be adjusted o that they cannot be
easily classified. The attacker manipulates these timing perturbations to mask the actual
delay of the packets. These common techniques used by attackers make the classification
of the packet streams at the stepping stones more difficult to detect, though not impossible.
The importance of stepping stone research is demonstrated in government proposals.
An Air Force solicitation explicitly requests research in identifying stepping stones to
enable traceback [3]. Figure 2.1 illustrates an example scenario from the solicitation in
which the attacker uses stepping stones to conceal its actual origin and make the traceback
more difficult.
Complex bot networks (botnets) and compromised servers are som examples of
present day attacks that commonly use stepping stones. These stepping stones serve as a
relay point so that the attacker can disguise their tracks orpenetrate deeper into a network.
The botnets normally contain an overlay network for commandcontrol which is
disguised by the use of stepping stones.
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Figure 2.1: Example of an attacker using stepping stones to conceal original location [3]
2.1.2 Botnets.
2.1.2.1 Botnet Overview.A great deal of current security research focuses on
analyzing and categorizing botnets. While this research does n t specifically serve this
purpose, a brief description of a botnet is included as it applies to the importance of the
stepping stone. The botnet is generally characterized by a bot, a botmaster, and the
command and control (C2) server. The bot is often the victim orend-user machine
running the bot software to communicate with the C2 server. Generally, the bot receives
commands issued remotely by the botmaster or botherder. Often, the commands between
the botmaster and the C2 server as well as the between the C2 server and the bot are not
relayed directly. Instead, stepping stones are often used to mask the origin of the C2
network. The most popular example of the stepping stone in bot ets is the Internet Relay
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Chat (IRC) server. In this scenario, the IRC server relays commands between the C2 host
and the bots.
While the botnet software is not always malicious, the majority of security research
involves preventing unknown malicious bots. Several characte istics make detecting these
unknown bots difficult. First, the communication in the botnet may lie dormantfor long
periods of time awaiting commands. Also, botnets may be divided into smaller sections
controlled by networks of C2 servers. The C2 server may direct at any time the bots to
migrate between servers and divert traffic to different machines. Lastly, some machines
may serve multiple botnets, creating a situation in which the amount of infected hosts
appears to exceed the number of physical infected hosts. Likewise, if the C2 server only
directs certain nodes to respond, the corollary may exist where the amount of infected
hosts is vastly underestimated [11].
In some cases, the commands sent to the bot may not be able to traverse the
endpoints in the original network configuration. In this case, stepping stones are used to
gain access to a network and broaden the depth of the botnet. Strayer identifies these
intermediate hosts asrendezvous-pointsand states that they may be hierarchical to support
scalability in the botnet [23]. Flow analysis assists in identifying botnet traffic not
originally observed. While the flow correlation does not necessarily mean a botnet is
present, it does offer a more focused effort on likely targets.
2.1.3 Compromised Hosts and Stepping Stones.Besides command and control for
botnets, attackers may simply use a compromised host as a stepping stone to obfuscate the
origin or penetrate deeper into an internal network. As attacker techniques become more
advanced, the scenarios typically include more steps. The standard Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) have difficulty identifying these multi-faceted attacks. Indeed, IDS
enhancements include a new modeling language introduced tocombat the complex
scenarios [1].
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Larger organizations in particular are common targets for stepping stone attacks.
While the majority of networks are behind security devices (e.g., firewalls or
Demilitarized Zones (DMZs)), even the compromise of one system can be used as a
stepping stone to reach the rest of the computers on the network. A report on network
security lists these stepping stone threats as one of the most probable avenues of attack for
external facing devices [18]. These threats for embedded devices may be greater due to
the difficulty in securing such devices. In fact, one resource indicates the possibility of
using an embedded web server inside a picture frame as a stepping stone to access the
entire company intranet [6].
2.1.4 Legitimate Stepping Stones.Not all traffic characterized as stepping stone
traffic is malicious (e.g., VoIP traffic or automated polling systems). Even using
decentralized peer-to-peer methodology to send this traffic may appear as stepping stones.
Other uses for stepping stones are cases in which administrator only allow access to
certain computers through gateways. In many cases the gateway performs like a legitimate
stepping stone or hop point. Policy based decisions must also be employed in the SSD to
ensure that legitimate stepping stone traffic is filtered from possible malicious traffic.
However, the policy based decision must be made carefully because the malicious traffic
may indeed closely resemble the legitimate traffic.
Previous research shows that VoIP traffic can be detected using stepping stone
detectors even when using anonymizing services. The detector a curately detects VoIP
traffic streams and identifies the endpoints by manipulating the delay b tween packets
[26]. This research carefully modifies the delay so that the endpoints could be detected
while not adversely affecting the voice quality. The research demonstrates that stepping
stone detection can be extended to identify endpoints of authorized traffic. Although the
VoIP traffic was authorized on the network, they were able to determine the ndpoints of
the conversation.
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2.1.5 Interactive Session Models.Much of the stepping stone research
concentrates on identifying and modeling interactive session based on human
interactions. Initial research modeled the inter-arrivalbetween packets as a Poisson
distribution. While this distribution was the basis for manyyears, other distributions (e.g.,
the empiricaltcplib distribution and the Pareto distribution) have proven moreaccurate in
modeling human-driven sessions [16].
In addition to the inter-packet delays, the stepping stone res arch must consider other
variables in the network such as jitter. A study on wide-scale WAN networks using the
PlanetLab overlay network concludes that the maximum jitter is approximately normally
distributed with a zero mean and a maximum standard deviation of 5 ms [14]. Additional
research observes the standard deviation of the jitter between 6.2 to 12 ms [8].
2.2 Initial Detection and Classification
The initial paper by Staniford-Chen introduced the concept of using a series of
computers to relay traffic [20]. By successfully logging on to each computer using a
UNIX terminal, this theory established a connection to the endpoint via intermediate
computers as stepping stones. The importance was illustrated by the increasing number of
intrusion attempts, as far back as 1995. Research by Staniford-Chen relies on thumb
printing the connections to identify the packet streams. The thumb print simply compares
the data payload on either side of the host to correlate the network flows. This is easily
circumvented using encryption or other data disguising technique. The concept was
extended by Zhang and Paxson where they first named the network stepping stone. This
work also set the stage for more robust detection methodologies including active
detections [32].
The SSDs are categorized according to technique and location. The techniques are
passive and active methods and the location of the SSD is host-based or network-based.
Table 2.1 shows various SSD techniques [28]. Similar to other host-based models, these
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detection methods require sensors or adjustments made at each individual host, whereas
network-based detection models take place at different points along the network path. The
passive detection methods do not modify or alter the packet,whereas the active-based
detection works primarily by altering the packet timing or payload.
Table 2.1: Classification of Existing Stepping Stone Detection Techniques
Passive Active
Host-based DIDS, CIS Caller ID
Network-based
Thumb printing IDIP
Timing-Based CITRA
Deviation-Based SWT
Online Sketching RAINBOW
SWIRL
2.3 Passive Detection
In the passive SSDs, the network traffic is classified without modification. The
obvious advantage is that the attacker can not determine if th detection is taking place.
Acting much like a sniffer it performs operations in a covert manner because the network
traffic is not modified. The passive detection can be further subdivided into host-based and
network-based passive detection.
2.3.1 Host-based Passive Detection.The two main examples of host-based
passive detection are the Distributed Intrusion DetectionSystem (DIDS) and the Caller
Identification System (CIS). DIDS is an early system developed by the University of
California at Davis to trace events as they progressed througthe network [19]. It uses
event monitors and triggers to correlate network activity to the user involved. As an
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example, if a user “smith” logs on to another machine using a guest account, the
host-based event generator triggers the Local Area Network(LAN) monitor about the new
connection. From there, if the user “smith” executes a network scan using the guest
account, the monitor could trace the logon attempt back to the user “smith” on the original
machine. A server maintains the full login chain to trace back communications to the
original user.
The CIS also uses the host-based detection approach but in a distributed manner [12].
Instead of a centralized server managing all of the connection states, when a host on
machinen attempts to connect to another host, it presents the currentlogi chain ofn
hosts for verification. The host at (n+ 1) then verifies the presented chain from computer
1 ton. The new connection is only authorized to login when the chain is fully verified.
The new host is then added to the login chain for future connections. This process
introduces additional overhead to the login process but does n t require the central server
to manage the state of the connections.
2.3.2 Network-based Passive Detection.Although the network-based passive
detection shows promise in many areas, it does not show significa t improvement over
using standard passive intrusion detection methods. Many of the techniques and
procedures are similar in that most use some form of statistical processing to match
existing data (e.g., Bayesian detection or correlation). The network-based passive
detection methods include thumb printing, timing-based andeviation-based. One of the
main drawbacks of the network-based approach is that it musttrust the sensors to provide
correct data. Most of the schemes presented for both active and p ssive network-based
detection rely on the fact that the sensor is not compromisedwhen verifying the integrity
of the data.
The thumb printing detection method first described by [7] and extended in [20]
describes a method in which the packet is assigned to a “thumbprint” at a central server
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based on the packet payload. This thumb print is analyzed andcorrelated with other
thumb prints to determine which connections are incoming and outgoing on a host. If the
thumb print matches both connections, then that host can be identified as a stepping stone
for that data stream. This relies on simple communication betwe n hosts and is easily
defeated using encryption or chaff packets.
The timing-based detection methods enhances SSD and demonstrates effectiveness at
detecting stepping stones, even if traffic is encrypted. The packet inter-arrival times are
analyzed using network devices and correlated to determinewhich packets matched both
incoming and outgoing streams [32]. Similar to the thumb printing, the timing-based
detection methods are based on correlation, but do not rely on the similarity of the
incoming and outgoing data to create a match.
Work by Donoho and Paxson identifies three key characteristics in detecting stepping
stones [5]. First, they show that random swaps of inter-packet delays within a given time
window provide a statistically provable method of correlating input and output streams.
Their technique selects a given time window and randomly interchanges the inter-packet
delays, retaining the underlying distribution. They also demonstrate that this technique is
non-causal. Second, this seminal work demonstrates applying the Discrete Wavelet
Transform (DWT) on vectors of inter-packet delays. The system correlates the network
streams using the DWT coefficients to identify the stepping stones. This research
analytically demonstrates the eff ctiveness using the Poisson distribution to model the
inter-arrival times. As previously mentioned, the distribut ons for interactive sessions are
not well modeled by the Poisson distribution; however, theyclaim the results should be
similar using the Pareto ortcplib distributions. The simulation using the empiricaltcplib
distribution shows promising results using the DWT correlation of coefficients. Lastly,
they show that these techniques may be resilient to and possibly even detect the presence
of chaff packets.
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Deviation based SSD operate similarly by analyzing the minium average delay gap
between the packet streams of two Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connections. The
deviation uses both the packet timing as well as the TCP sequence number. Note that the
TCP payload is not considered in the calculation. One obviousdrawback of the
deviation-based SSD is that it is only valid for TCP connections. Other reasons for the
deviation-based approach failures were caused by Unix broadcast traffic that replicated
stepping stones as well as connections with very large latencies. In the case of the Unix
broadcast applications, the correlated traffic matches two flows from one distinct source
(e.g., fromh1→ h2 andh1→ h3). This could be easily sorted out since it does not
conform to a stepping stone which would beh1→ h2→ h3. In the latter case, if a user
logged on to a system from a foreign country and then returneda connection back to the
country, the algorithm had difficulty detecting the stepping stone due to the large latency
[30].
One of the latest approaches involves a technique called Online Sketching as
described in [2]. Online sketching uses an algorithm to examine flows at the network
boundary to identify stepping stone traffic. Based on data sketches, which are widely used
in stream analysis, the algorithm maintains short sketchesof data streams to identify the
stepping stones at the network boundaries. Through experimental verification of 100 SSH
flows, online sketching identifies 95% of the stepping stone data streams even with
additional perturbations, chaff packets and background traffic in the data set. One main
advantage of this technique was that in traditional passivecorrelation analysis,O(n×m)
calculations are required wheren andmare the ingress and egress data flows, respectively.
This process of online sketching only requiresO(n+
√
n×m) calculations. The main
disadvantages of this approach is that to be eff ctive against a certain flow, the parameters
must be selected very carefully. Because of this, it was not robust against flows that
deviated from this original characteristic. In other words, if the parameters were chosen to
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identify a flow with approximately 2.5 packets per second, a new flow that was 10 packets
per second may not be detected with the same accuracy.
2.4 Active Detection
The active detection methods for SSD require more sophistication but offer better
results in general when compared to the passive methods. Because they are able to
manipulate the packets or data streams, they require codes an programs to create the
desired effect. This also means that they may introduce undesirable effects (e.g., as added
packet delay or bottlenecks) depending on the network performance. While the
computational complexity may be reduced in the active detection, the scalability may be
affected due to the network resources.
2.4.1 Host-based Active Detection.Caller ID (not to be confused with CIS) is an
active detection method that was proposed by Staniford-Chenand reportedly used by the
Air Force [20]. It proposes that in order for an attacker to use a chain of stepping stones,
each link in the chain must contain a vulnerability. Similarto a “hack-back” approach, the
Caller ID system would attempt to gain access to each host in the chain to identify the
path. Obvious legal and technical restrictions make this approach somewhat unfeasible,
especially to identify an attacker in real-time. While an attacker can take months to
establish a series of stepping stones, the Caller ID approachm y not work in a timely
manner, if at all.
2.4.2 Network-based Active Detection.As the primary thrust of this research, it is
important to analyze the advantages and drawbacks of past network-based active detection
techniques. Early thumb printing attempts led the way to more advanced timing-based as
well as deviation-based detectors able to identify stepping stones, even when obfuscated
by encryption and chaffing. The active detection led the way to activewatermarksin order
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to reduce the computational complexity of the algorithms and improve detection rates.
The fundamental block diagram for network-based watermarking is shown in Figure 1.2.
2.4.2.1 Active detection based on packet payload.The Cooperative Intrusion
Traceback and Response Architecture (CITRA), based on the original Intrusion
Identification and Isolation Protocol (IDIP) system, provides an infrastructure that enables
IDSs, firewalls, and other network components to cooperatively trace and block network
intrusions. The original IDIP design is a protocol for reporting intrusion-related events and
coordinating the attack traceback. Additionally, it allows for an automated response action
and reduces the network manager’s workload in the event of anatt ck. The CITRA system
extends this to multiple functional neighborhoods that communicate with each other to
correlate findings. Much of the analysis focuses on the defens against a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, as the IDSs constantly exchange information in order to
locate the attacker [21]. Although this approach does not modify the packets on the
network level, it is classified as an active approach becauseof the information exchanged
between the IDSs. Wang also questions the ability of the intermediate boundary controller
to identify an intrusion solely based on a hard-coded attackdescription [28].
The Sleepy Watermark Tracing (SWT) approach is another active network-based
detection and tracing framework [29]. It is referred to assleepybecause it only is
triggered in the event of a detected intrusion. Once an intrusion is detected, it activates the
SWT to embed the watermark in the packets. The watermark is a “virtual null string” that
is injected into the packet that appears null to the end user of the application. In the case
of the telnet and rlogin applications, a virtual null stringmay consist of a series of “\b”
characters. Guardian boundary devices correlate the SWT to incoming and outgoing
packet streams. An important feature of this research is theresponse of actual hardware to
the SWT. They showed that the SWT gateway latency overhead is only approximately 50
µs. Although the SWT technique shows promising results, it is ineffective if the stepping
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stone uses link-to-link encryption. It also requires that each host needs a single, trusted
guardian gateway to correlate the packet streams.
2.4.2.2 Active detection using timing information.Modifying packet timings
is an active method in which the watermark information is embdded in the packet timings
instead of the actual packet data. These techniques can be furth r classified as blind or
non-blind depending on the amount of information passed between the watermarker and
the detector. In a blind system, the detector only has accessto a ecret key shared between
it and the watermarker. In a non-blind system, additional information about the packet
stream is passed to the detector, typically through an out-of-band channel. Table 2.2
shows the classification of the current watermarking techniques as blind or non-blind.
Table 2.2: Classification of Active Watermark Stepping StoneDetection Techniques
Blind Non-Blind
SWT RAINBOW
ICBW C-RAINBOW
SWIRL
Loosely based on the active SWT, Wang proposes actively modifying the packet
delays for the Interval Centroid Based Watermark (ICBW) technique n order to correlate
the streams of traffic. Instead of embedding the marking in the stream data, this
framework adjusts the delay of the packets to encode the corrlated values in the delays.
This technique has better detection rates and less False-Positives (FPs) than the passive
counterpart; however, the technique does not adequately scale [27]. Later research shows
ICBW successfully traced active VoIP conversations through anonymizing networks [25].
Additionally, researchers later demonstrate, however, that adjusting the inter-packet delay
could be subverted using multi-flow attacks.
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Another similar approach is to manipulate the arrival timesof the packets using
preselected time intervals. This Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) technique is
proposed to alleviate the problem of repacketization [29].In the case of SSH and other
applications, this is a natural eff ct and poses a challenge to the detection of stepping
stones. Each flow is sliced into short fixed-length time intervals. The watermark is
embedded in these slices by manipulating the packet count duri g the specific intervals.
The research shows that using synthetically-generated SSHtraffic flows with the empirical
tcplib distribution, it achieves 100% detection rates with under 1& FP rate.
Similar to the previously mentioned techniques, a proposalf DSSS watermarking
process shows promising results by encoding a binary watermrk ofn bits in an interval of
lengthTs. Therefore, the packet length needs to be at leastnTs long in order to encode the
entire watermark. Both the watermarker and the detector mustagree on the parameters for
the lengthTs as well as the Pseudo Noise (PN) code. Then bits are based on a PN code
similar to the DSSS codes used in radio signal transmissions. Thi allows the detector to
recover the watermark by applying a high-pass filter to the rec iv d signal and
subsequently passing it through a de-spreading and low-pass filter [31].
Although the packet inter-arrival modification techniquesonly share the key to the
detector, they are all vulnerable to multi-flow attacks as described in [13]. In this attack on
the watermarking scheme, it is assumed that the attacker gained control of the stepping
stone and can monitor the incoming and outgoing flows. If multiple external flows are
generated to this host, then the attacker can collect the timing and recover the secret
watermark key. Indeed, such actions allow an attacker to both detect and remove the
watermark for ICBW and Interval Based Watermark (IBW) techniques.
The Robust and Invisible Non-Blind Watermark (RAINBOW) detection system
Houmansadr proposes extends aspects of the SSD to be robust against packet losses [10].
It begins by storing the timing information for a specific flowin a database where
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tui |i = 1, . . . ,n+ 1, and the superscriptu refers to the unmarked flow entering the
watermarker. Next, it delays the packet by a valuewi with values of±a with equal
probability:
wi =















+a w.p. 12
−a w.p. 12
(2.1)
The valuea represents the amount of watermarking and is chosen small enough that it is
invisible to ordinary users and attackers. In order to detect the watermark in this non-blind
system, the detector has the timingsti as well as the watermark componentswi. The
detector then determines if a watermark is present based on an rmalized correlation
scheme. In typical connections such as SSH and any TCP connection, all packets do not
have a corresponding egress packet due to repacketization or other reasons (i.e., initial
SYN packets, RST packets and FIN packets). The RAINBOW system incorporates
selective correlation to account for packet loss. This selectiv correlation adds an
additional matching step in order to find and remove packets that do not have a
corresponding match in the other flow using sliding windows.Although the RAINBOW
technique produces promising results, it lacks efficiency and is not scalable.
The original RAINBOW technique is further extended into the C-RAINBOW by
adding additional error correcting into the watermark [9].Instead of using thenA bits for
the watermark, the C-RAINBOW uses Repeat-Accumulate (RA) codes to repeat thenA
bits q times. This repetition provides error correction to account for noisy networks and
better detector performance. This model also passes the information through a soft-limiter
block in order to remove excess noise from the system. The C-RAINBOW is modeled
using MATLAB over 10000 samples and compared to the RAINBOW results. The
simulation demonstrates that the detection rate increasesusing the samenA while the
number of FPs decrease. The C-RAINBOW also detects smaller values of the watermark
amplitude,a, which is the “jitter” created by the watermarker.
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The SWIRL is an extension of the RAINBOW technique and is the first blind
active-based network detection scheme that claims to be robust against packet losses,
multi-flow attacks and is scalable [8]. The system selects packet intervals of lengthT and
divides them intor subintervals. SWIRL then further subdivides each subinterval into m
slots as noted in Figure 2.2. The permutationπr−1 modifies the number of packets in each
slot according to the secret watermark key. A base interval is lso selected so that the
detector can identify the information. The selection of theparameters must be carefully
considered depending on the traffic characteristics. The crossover point between the FP
andFalse-Negative (FN) rates is calculated and sets the ideal point for choosing the
parameters for SWIRL. The SWIRL is modeled using MATLAB and previously captured
traffic. In addition, live experiments over the PlanetLab infrastructure test the
performance. Extracted packet timings from the CAIDA 2009 January dataset are the
basis for the SSH timings. The True-Positive (TP) and FP detection rates closely match
the theoretical values and demonstrate that the technique may be viable in a large scale
network.
Slot #      0      1       2       3      0       1      2       3  
Interval (T)
Subinterval (T/r)
Slot (T/mr)
Figure 2.2: SWIRL Slot Numbering (m= 4, r = 2) [8]
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2.5 Other Detection Methods
2.5.1 Hybrid Detection. In other works, hybrid detections propose combining
active and passive techniques to form a more elaborate system for the SSD [15]. One of
the hybrid approaches involve a system that integrates the host-based and network-based
detection in an intelligent system. The research proposes that the idea was possible,
although no metrics or proofs are derived. It is mainly a theoretical design which in theory
could reduce the number of FPs and increases overall accuracy of the SSD. The main
claim is that the trust problem in the host-based system could be alleviated using the data
from the network-based system creating a more robust detection system. No efforts are
shown to prove how effective the hybrid model would be at improving the trust in the
host-based system.
2.5.2 Data Mining. Closely related to the passive correlation methods, there also
is research involving data mining of packet streams [23]. Using the standard data mining
techniques on a known benign botnet, one report shows that the first stage of filtering can
reduce the amount of non-important data streams by a factor of 37. Beginning with
8,933,303 TCP flows, filters remove obvious packets such as large file transfers and
reduce the amount of flows requiring correlation to 238,252.This is accomplished without
using port classifications so that traffic masquerading on unexpected ports would still be
detected. In the next classifier stage, the remaining flows are p ssed through three
machine learning systems. Between the J48 decision tree, Naive B yes and Bayesian
Networks, the naive Bayes classifier performed best in terms of the FN rate and FP rate.
The average bytes per packet also have the highest discriminatory power in detecting the
botnet traffic. These two stages reduce the correlated traffic to approximately 48,000
packets from the original 8,933,303.
In the next stage, the correlation algorithm attempts to ident fy flows as a part of a
stepping stone from the remaining packets. Instead of calculating the correlation value
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based on a computationally expensive algorithm ofO(n2) wheren is the number of active
flows, they use a new technique. While the correlation could not identify all of the known
botnet traffic, the outliers are attributed to implementing the softwareinside a virtual
machine. The research concludes that the virtual machine and the reduced calculations
offered by the new algorithm affects the timing preventing the necessary correlation. In
the last automated stage, a topological analysis determinewhich of the remaining flows
had common endpoints. Lastly, a manual analysis of the flows must be performed to
reveal the presence of the stepping stone.
Further research described in [22] expands the improved correlation algorithm
expressing the following characteristics as a time series:
• Packet event times
• Packet inter-arrival times
• Inter-burst times
• Bytes per packet
• Cumulative bytes per packet
• Bytes per burst
• Periodic throughput samples
The new algorithm examines the characteristics vector of each flow as a point inn-space.
Using Euclidean distance of the points and the Estimated Weight d Moving
Average (EWMA) (α = 0.75) to calculate the moments as a running estimate, the results
are then correlated. Plotting the Probability Density Functio (PDF) of the distances,
multiple spikes are seen corresponding to highly correlated flow pairs. In this example,
they correctly hypothesized that the C2 flows were the pairs with distances closest to 0.
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The topological analysis show all but one of the expected flows in a graphical format. The
only flow not detected is an off-site host because the flow does not closely correlate to the
flows of the local bots. This demonstrates that the scheme is effective at detecting local
bots, but it cannot correlate the traffic to off-site hosts even if the C2 server was local.
2.6 Error Correction and Coding
The watermarks must be present even when there is noise and distortions of the
original data. Therefore, coding theory for error detection and correction offer an
opportunity to increase the detection rate while maintaining the same encoding and
decoding algorithms. As some of the SSD techniques use errorco rection and coding
schemes, these applications directly apply to the future work d ne in this area. The RA
code is an example that is fairly low complexity and easy to derive. Demonstrated in
1998, RA is a simple and low complexity code that provides goodperformance using
Maximum-Likelihood (ML) decoding [4]. Although the complexity of the ML decoding
is prohibitively large, it is also shown that the “turbo-like” decoding which approximates
the ML decoding also performs well. In the case of the RA code, an information block of
sizenA is first repeatedq times. Theq× nA data is then scrambled by a permutation
function and encoded by a rate 1 accumulator. The RA code rate is 1/q with a linear
encoding time, making the technique fast.
2.7 Evading Detection
Before describing the various attempts to identify steppingstones, a discussion on the
various techniques attackers employ to evade stepping stones is necessary. The different
evasion techniques are important to understand as they significantly impact the
development of the algorithms to identify the stepping stones. The properties of evasion
are also critical to understand the effectiveness of the SSD techniques. Some of the more
obvious techniques are encrypting the data as well as spoofing packets. While fairly trivial
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to implement, these do not offer much resilience against detection. More advanced
techniques include timing perturbation as well as packet chaffing. In timing perturbation,
the individual packet timing is adjusted so that the correlation between the incoming and
outgoing stream is more difficult. Depending on the level of perturbation, this correlation
is still possible using current SSDs. Packet chaffing is simple in design as shown in Figure
2.3(a), but not trivial to implement [5]. The changes present an evolution in the stepping
stone from being a simple pass thru device to a more active filter. Indeed, the method of
evading detection presents new challenges to the SSD problem.
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Figure 2.3: Examples of Evading Detection
In addition to evading detection, the attacker may implement active techniques to
deceive the detector. Assuming the attacker controls the stepping stone, there exists a
26
possibility of modifying the network packets via a multi-flow attack as shown in Figure
2.3(b). For example, if the attacker controld the stepping stone and establishes multiple
flows of traffic into the host, then analysis of these flows could be performed. If any
deviation is exhibited from the original traffic patterns, then the attacker may assume the
presence of a watermark and can lead to the identification andremoval of the watermark.
2.8 Summary
The importance of detecting stepping stones, whether the atackers use botnets or
simple SSH commands, is very difficult. However, detecting stepping stones in real time
is invaluable to a network defender responsible for protecting a computer network. While
the passive based approaches show promise with less mature attackers, the increased
complexity of the attacker coupled with the computational resources needed make these
methods inferior. Indeed, active based watermarking techniques have proven effective
given the ever increasing network and attacker complexity.In the following chapters we
present a novel active technique effective at identifying interactive sessions used in
stepping stones.
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3 Methodology
The methodology in this research consists of three main steps. First, timestamps are
extracted and analyzed from previously recorded network conversations from the CAIDA
2009 [24] dataset. Next, after the watermarking technique is developed and refined, it is
simulated using the previously captured CAIDA 2009 timestamps. Finally, the timestamps
are used again to generate live watermarked traffic using stepping stones in the Amazon
EC2 environment.
3.1 Problem Definition
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.The main goal of this research is to effectively detect
network stepping stones by applying a novel semi-blind active watermarking technique. A
subset of the goal is to better characterize typical stepping stone network traffic. The
system should be scalable with acceptable rates of detection. It also should not
significantly change the characteristics of the original waveform.
Characterizing a “better” detection technique involves many f ctors including the FP
and FN rates and the rate of detection relative to the number of network packets needed.
The hypothesis is that by characterizing the selected Secure Shell (SSH) traces, a novel
technique of watermarking the timestamps can be identified that demonstrates an
acceptable level of accuracy and speed (e.g., number of packets or interval detection
length) while retaining resistance against known attacks.Generally, the number of packets
and time required to detect the watermark affect the accuracy. If the number of packets
required for the higher detection rate is excessive, the technique may not be as eff ctive.
For example, if the system identifies 10% more stepping stonebut it requires ten times
the number of packets, it may not be suitable because many network conversations are
short-lived.
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3.1.2 Approach. To improve stepping stone detection, this system illustrates
novel technique to watermark network packets. The main components of this research
comprise characterization of the traffic, algorithm development, and system testing.
Using a selected set of typical stepping stone traffic from the historical SSH traces
extracted from the CAIDA 2009 dataset [24], opportunities toexploit previously unknown
aspects of the stepping stone traffic are used to improve the detection algorithm. The
random samples of historical data are used for traffic generation during the experiments.
The simulation model estimates the algorithm performance ia controlled, theoretical
experiment.
Once the model is analyzed and the algorithm is adjusted, a live experiment further
verifies the performance. Often times, analytical models innetworks have different
variances when compared to live network traffic. For that reason, live performance
analysis is critical to establish validity and demonstratethat the recommendations improve
detection.
3.1.2.1 Analysis. The full CAIDA 2009 dataset includes over 2.4
Tebibyte (TiB) of network data without any payload information. Initially, tcpdump filters
port 22 traffic relevant to SSH or Secure Copy (SCP) containing data. Data packets are the
primary targets to modify using the active watermarking. The timing of management
commands (i.e., TCP setup, acknowledgement and reset packets) is not conducive to
modification because of required buffering which prevents atomic processes from
completing. The simple tcpdump filters reduce the amount of inf rmation to be processed
to approximately 5 gibibyte (GiB). Writing a program to parse th files and extract the
timestamps requires multiple steps. Note that more specificdetails are provided in
Appendix A. First, the program identifies the tuple of each packet containing the source
Internet Protocol (IP), source port, destination IP and destination port. It then maintains a
database of tuples identifying each individual network stream. Next, as the database of
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tuples fills to approximately 90%, it periodically filters out all streams containing fewer
than a specified amount of timestamps. This removes the streams when a connection is
attempted, but not actually made. In this research, the maxium amount specified for
removing network conversations is fourteen packets in length. This prevents stale
conversations from filling the database too quickly while retaining the longer lived
conversations ideal for testing the watermark technique. Th program maintains a
database of approximately 50,000 entries and purges stale valu s when the capacity
reaches approximately 90% capacity. The program records the timestamp of each packet
when the destination port is 22, indicating SSH or SCP traffic. The final filter removes all
traces containing an average packet size greater than one kibibyte (KiB). Typical packet
sizes of SCP traffic average larger sizes, so the filter removes traffic that indicates SCP
rather than SSH. The final file size for the extracted timestamps for the CAIDA 2009
dataset is approximately 140 mebibyte (MiB).
3.1.2.2 Comparison to Previous Data.Sixty traces from the Houmansadr
data [8] (also extracted from the CAIDA 2009 January dataset)ar compared to the data
after parsing the files. Though the actual tuple that corresponds with the previous research
is not provided, Houmansadr indicates that the traces are truncated so that they are all
approximately 120 seconds in length. Both the extracted and the Houmansadr traces
reveal that the typical SSH traffic inter-packet delays are generally bimodal and contains
peaks at approximately 0.05 and 0.2 seconds. The plots generat d previously show some
indications of the bimodal inter-packet delays, but they also show that there are many plots
in which there is a high rate of traffic without much deviation. Although Houmansadr
references that he is able to extract over 300 useful SSH traces from the January CAIDA
2009 dataset, the filters described in Section 3.1.2.1 reveal only 99 useful traces for this
experiment. Figure 3.1 illustrates the comparison of the int r-packet delays of the
extracted data and a similar dataset provided by Houmansadr. Figure 3.2 shows the density
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plot of the inter-packet delays of the same samples. Note thaAppendix B illustrates the
unused traces that exhibit characteristics not consistentwith human-generated traffic.
These rejected traces show constant packet rates as well as extrem ly high rates of speed.
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Figure 3.1: Example Plots of Extracted Timestamps and Houmansadr Data
3.1.2.3 Inter-packet Delay of SSH Streams.The density plots of the
inter-packet delays reveal that most of the traces appear tobe bimodal. The bimodal
distribution is not consistent with previous research thatindicates the inter-packet delay is
distributed according to a Poisson distribution; however,the distribution is consistent with
recent research regarding the inter-packet delays. The bimodal characteristics of the
differential time values are shown in Figure 3.3. A bimodal distribu ion does not lead to an
obvious method to watermark as it is difficult to retain the underlying statistics, making
the watermark invisible. Analyzing the differences between the inter-packet delays shows
that it follows closely to a normal distribution. The analysis of the difference between the
packet delays closely resembles a second derivative and progresses smoothly to an
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Figure 3.2: Example Density Plots of Inter-packet Delays for Extracted Data and
Houmansadr Data
analysis using DWT techniques. It is important to note that this analysis is different from a
lag -2 plot, which shows the difference between every other packet. Instead, this analysis
illustrates the differential analysis of the timestamp differentials.
3.1.2.4 Discrete Wavelet Transform.As indicated in the background,
previous multimedia watermarking techniques use the DWT. The fundamental waveform
for the DWT is the Haar transform and is applied to the SSH time diff rentials. The values
indicate that the first three vectors are approximately normally distributed around zero for
all of the SSH traces. This leads the algorithm development to use first detail vectord1 of
the DWT to encode the watermark values using the sign of the vector. Pilot experiments
result in the final algorithm shown in Figure 3.4 and the detector in Figure 3.5. Note that
the synchronization frame and parity check are features that correct problems later
observed after adding simulated jitter.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Differential Time Intervals for SSH Streams. Three values
chosen from the 2009 January CAIDA dataset to show bimodal chara teristics.
3.2 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) consists of many components. TheSSD includes the
watermarker and the detector as well as the network equipment and hosts. The dotted
lines in Figure 3.6 reflect the logical boundary of the system. While the components may
be physically or geographically separated, the mechanism performing the active
watermarking and the component responsible for detecting the watermarks define the
logical boundaries.
In the simplest design, the SUT is self-contained in the protected network. In more
complex designs and with appropriate permissions, the waterm rker and detector do not
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Figure 3.4: Algorithm of the Watermarker
need to be on the same physical or logical network. With the proper parameter selection,
the detection mechanism is robust against variances causedby the network.
The main Component Under Test (CUT) is the watermark detectionalgorithm. While
both the watermarker and the detector perform two different operations, the actual CUT is
the detection algorithm. This research builds on previous designs and tests conducted to
achieve a high level of detection with the fewest number of packets or time. Immediate
and accurate identification of the stepping stones are the most i portant characteristics of
a system that is operationally useful to network defense. This research introduces a novel
watermarking technique and evaluates the eff ctiveness.
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Figure 3.5: Algorithm of the Detector
3.3 System Services
The SSD provides active network watermark detection in the presence of robust
countermeasures without significantly affecting the network characteristics. The success
of the system primarily resides in accurate stepping stone det ction. Given a null
hypothesis that there is no watermark present at the detector, the outcomes of the detector
fall into one of four categories:
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Figure 3.6: The System Under Test and Component Under Test
• True Positive (TP): The detector correctly identifies a watermarked stream as
watermarked.
• False Positive (FP): The detector falsely identifies a non-watermarked stream as
watermarked.
• True Negative (TN): The detector correctly identifies a non-watermarked stream as
non-watermarked.
• False Negative (FN): The detector falsely identifies a watermarked stream as
non-watermarked.
The watermark presence is determined at the detector by the watermark statisticτ. This is
calculated as a ratio of successfully detected synchronization frames divided by the
number of total frames. Comparing this statistic to the detection thresholdγ determines
whether a watermark is present. Adjusting the threshold to ahigher value (i.e., closer to 1)
results in less FP values, but increases the number of FNs. Lowering the threshold (i.e.,
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closer to 0) generates more positively identified watermarkstreams, increasing the FPs
while lowering the FNs.
Another system service is the modified network stream. The modifications of the
inter-packet delays may indicate to an attacker that the stream is altered. Previous research
indicates that this watermarking technique is resilient tocryptanalysis and the distribution
of the watermark data is nearly identical to the original.
Significant system failures represent a critical reductionin the effectiveness of the
system in terms of the overall goal. A false negative detection represents an active
stepping stone that is not detected and therefore can pass freely in the network. While the
attacker may need additional measures to remove a watermark, the active removal of a
watermark by the attacker is also a critical system failure.
The sub-optimal performance measures demonstrate system failures in which the
system may not perform ideally, but the goal of detecting thes epping stones when present
is still maintained. False positive detection may require human intervention to filter the
false detections and can degrade overall performance if it is too severe. The detectable
watermark and network interference both provide the stepping stones with additional
information regarding detection tactics, but these do not represent critical failures of the
system to detect the stepping stones.
3.4 Workload
The stepping stone traffic has factors that are considered system workloads. The
packet size, throughput and inter-packet delay are important factors that significantly alter
the performance of the algorithm. The primary factors affecting the algorithm are the
inter-packet delay distribution and packet inter-arrivalrate. Because the detector is
fundamentally based on the positioning of packets, carefully chosen parameters are often
only effective against traffic that follows a certain workload. If the algorithm changes in
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any way, other factors may have greater influence. The primary factors in this system are
the stepping stone traffic throughput and inter-packet delays.
In this experiment, the workload factors are chosen by randomly selecting previously
recorded SSH traffic flows from the CAIDA dataset as system inputs. The packet timings
are watermarked and input to the detector. To analyze the FP detection, random unmarked
packet streams bypass the watermarker and are input directly into the detector. The
simulation and live experiments use a random selection fromthe CAIDA 2009 dataset.
3.5 Performance Metrics
In the SSD, the primary goal is to detect network stepping stones. Indeed, accurate
detection without significantly altering statistical distr butions are the primary factors in
optimizing the algorithm. The primary metrics are significant to identifying the presence
of a watermark and correctly extracting each encoded bit. Secondary metrics not essential
to this system are addressed, but are not the main focus of theresearch. The primary
performance metrics to evaluate the SSD are:
• False Negative Detection Rate
• False Positive Detection Rate
• Correctly Extracted Watermark Bits
The FN rates are essential metrics in evaluating the accuracy of the detection system.
From an operator workload perspective, the FP rate is equally important to identify the
detections that are not true stepping stones. The bits detected per watermarked stream are
important to identify the accuracy of the system as well as the detection speed. Although
the threshold determines whether the entire stream is detected as watermarked, the
number of bits correctly detected per watermarked stream isalso important in correlating
the stepping stones.
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3.6 System Parameters
All of the parameters that affect the performance of the system can be characterized
as workload parameters and system parameters. These are shown in Table 3.1. Figure 3.7
also shows the SUT with the parameters, workloads and outputs. The system is most
sensitive to the watermark interval length directly correlating with the number of
timestamps in each stream. The frame size determines the amount of timestamps
necessary for the watermark and must be a multiple of the number of encoded bits. In this
experiment, the system encodes seven bits with one parity bit, so the frame size must be at
least 16 (i.e., (7+ 1)× 2). A frame size of 32 is also tested in the simulation. The bit
detection level determines the number of correct bits requid to identify each
synchronization frame. Typically this value is either 0 or 1in the pilot studies, but
increasing the value allows for the detection in the presence of greater noise. The
minimum value of 0 decreases the likelihood of a false positive, but it may pass over
actual synchronization frames if there is a large amount of network noise. The frame size
is expected to affect the system, but not as much as the bit detection level. Thethreshold is
selected to minimize the FP and FN rates and the rest of the parameters have a low
sensitivity to the system.
Table 3.1: System and Workload Parameters
System Parameters Workload Parameters
Watermark Interval Length Previous SSH trace to be watermarked
Frame Size (s) Previous SSH trace not to be watermarked
Bit Detection Level (T)
Watermark Threshold (γ)
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Figure 3.7: System Inputs, Parameters and Outputs.
3.7 Factors
In concert with the primary motivation for this research, the system parameters
involving the watermarking and detection algorithm are themain factors to be studied.
The algorithm factors include the selection of the bit detection level, frame size, and
watermark threshold (γ). In addition, factors during the simulation include the simulated
noise (jitter) and the network path for the live experiment.
These factors shown in Table 3.2 are the subset of the system parameters evaluated in
the simulated experiment based on expected performance measures. The simulation
results confirm whether the levels should be maintained in the experimental design or if
they should be modified. A preliminary threshold for the liveexperiment is also
determined during the simulation. The simulation comparesth watermark statistic to the
expected theoretical value in order to further validate theexpected results and ensure the
model is accurate. The simulated jitter levels are selectedto be similar to previous
research by Houmansadr. Other research shows that worst case jitter values range around
5 ms [14], so these chosen values represent values beyond previous research extremes.
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A comparative analysis used for validation is performed using both the extracted
SSH traces as well as 60 traces provided by Amir Houmansadr aspart of the SWIRL
research. The extracted dataset provides the fundamental values; the Houmansadr traces
are used to validate this research against previous watermark research.
Table 3.2: Factors for Simulated Experiment
Factors for Experiment Levels
Simulated Jitter 6.2-12 ms Standard Deviation
Detection Threshold 0, 1 bits
SSH Trace Data Watermarked Traces, Unmarked Traces
Table 3.3: Factors for Live Experiment
Factors for Experiment Levels
Network Path Tokyo, Ireland, California, Virginia
SSH Trace Data Watermarked Traces, Unmarked Traces
3.8 Evaluation Technique
The two evaluation phases of the SSD are simulation and a liveexp riment. The
simulation watermarks the timestamps of a random extractedCAIDA SSH trace. The
client generates packets at intervals based on these timesta p . The packets timings are
then modified using Gaussian noise and input to the detector.The watermarker and
detector are simulated in a statistical package called R. Theresults determine the
interaction between factors and also estimate the amount ofreplications to run in the live
experiment.
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The live experiment uses the same random sampling of traces,but the output of the
watermarker and detector are performed using hardware imple entations. Because each
random sample is approximately two minutes in length, the number of replications in this
phase is less than the analytical phase. Each of the computers in the live experiment are
virtualized t1.micro Amazon EC2 instances. The configurations f the packet generator,
repeaters, and the receiver are listed in table 3.4. The packet generator and receiver code is
written in Python using the Twisted module version 11.0.0 and Scapy module version
2.1.0.
A graphical depiction of the live server locations is shown in F gure 3.8. The black
lines represent packets generated by the client and the red lines show the direction of the
stepping stone traffic. The California server generates all of the live traffic and sends it to
one of the repeaters or the final destination in Virginia. Therepeaters forward the traffic
on to the next server and ultimately all end in Virginia. The network path for the repeaters
is Tokyo to Ireland to Oregon to Virginia. Four separate processes on the client generate
independent data streams simultaneously during the experimental phase. The combination
of marked and unmarked traffic more accurately simulates noisy network environments.
Table 3.4: Live Experiment Hardware in Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud
System Location Zone AMI Linux Distribution
Client California us-west-1b ami-1bd68a53 Red Hat Linux (64-bit)
Repeater 1 Tokyo ap-northeast-1a ami-0644f007 Red Hat Linux (32-bit)
Repeater 2 Ireland eu-west-1c ami-953b06e1 Red Hat Linux (64-bit)
Repeater 3 Oregon us-west-2a ami-38fe7308 Red Hat Linux (32-bit)
Server Virginia us-east-1a ami-60ee1109 Ubuntu Linux (32-bit)
42
Figure 3.8: Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud Locations
The validation strategy includes a cross-validation of thesimulation and live
experiments and a comparison against previous research. The live experiment results
should match closely those predicted from the simulated model. Comparisons using the
previous Houmansadr data to the SWIRL design also help validate the research against
another watermarking technique.
3.9 Experimental Design
The experiment requires a full-factorial of the parametersto quantify the interaction
as well as a substantial amount of replications to allow for the jitter levels. Based on
previous research, approximately 1,000 replications create a sufficient statistical basis for
analysis and the pilot studies determine the statistical significance of these results.
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Therefore, approximately 24,000 total iterations are needed to evaluate the system
performance and validate the system against previous research.
The live experiment requires a full factorial of the servers(i.e., Tokyo, Ireland,
Oregon and Virginia) and the marked and unmarked data. The extracted SSH traces are
selected at random for each sample. Based on the pilot studies, approximately 100
samples of 120 seconds in length are required to estimate theFP and FN values for each
server. The amount of repetitions is based on the variance ofthe data. Assuming four
independent sessions consisting of three watermarked and one unmarked session, the total
number of trials per repetition is 4× 4× 100= 1,600. A total of five repetitions results in
8,000 trials in the live experiment. Assuming each trial is approximately 120 seconds and
four processes run simultaneously, the live experiment takes bout 67 hours.
The model confidence level is 95% to establish factors beforea hardware
implementation is considered. Before progressing to the live experiment, the simulation
should show that the watermarked and unmarked statistics are different at a 95%
confidence level or better. Because of the effort required to build and run the live network
model, a 95% confidence level ensures that the model can determine within the specified
statistical accuracy, that the performance is in fact superior. The variance in the live
experiment may be greater than expected, but the results should still show a difference
between the marked and unmarked streams at a 95% confidence level or better.
3.10 Methodology Summary
This research analyzes previous network traffic and introduces a novel watermarking
technique. The traffic characterization uses statistics to analyze previous captured network
traces from the CAIDA dataset to characterize traffic typical for a stepping stone. The
research analyzes inter-packet delays for the diff rent streams and determines the
characteristics of the traffic to better optimize the detection parameters.
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The extracted timestamps are used as data inputs to test the algorithm using a
computer simulation in R. The results of the simulation establish the baseline for
validating the algorithm and the live experiment. Factors such as parity checking and
framing are evaluated in the algorithm to determine interactions and achieve a more
optimal performance in the live experiment. The simulationalso sets an initial baseline for
the threshold value used to determine if a watermark is present.
Finally, the traffic generated by a live computer is passed through various stepping
stones across the Amazon EC2 to determine true rates in live environments. This
substantiates the analysis in the simulated model. This technique is expected to detect the
presence of the watermark with predictable error rates using similar stream sizes (i.e.,
length of time) to the SWIRL design . The values extracted by thedet ctor are also
expected to match the watermark sent by the client.
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4 Analysis and Results
In this chapter, the traffic analysis of the CAIDA 2009 dataset is first presented. The
features are used to develop the algorithm of the watermarker nd the detector. Next, the
simulation results demonstrate a statistical difference between the watermarked data and
the unmarked data. Based on results, a threshold is determined to detect the presence of
the watermark. Finally, the analysis of the live simulationdemonstrates that this technique
is a viable watermarking algorithm for certain types of interactive traffic.
4.1 Traffic Analysis
Analysis of timestamps reveal important characteristics.First, Figure 4.1 illustrates
the first level Haar wavelet decomposition vectorsd1, d2, andd3. Each of the vectors are
approximately normally distributed around zero. Second, the density plot of the
timestamps appear bimodal. The Haar observation is useful in applying the watermark
using the DWT because the watermark must retain the bimodal chara teristic for
invisibility.
The Haar wavelet decomposition is performed using thewaveslimlibrary in R. The
first vector represents a scaled value for the difference of the pairs of time differentials.
For example, using the time differentialsn0,n1,n2, · · · ,nj the values of the first vectord1
is as shown in Equation 4.1.
d1n =
−1
√
2
(ni − ni+1),n = 1,3, · · · ,n− 1 (4.1)
The plot of the first three vectors for the four level Haar decomp sition using 32,768
unique timestamp differentials is shown in Figure 4.1. As shown in the figure, the values
for the first vector are approximately normally distributedaround zero. This discovery of
the vector distribution originally led to the realization of the watermark application using
the sign of the vectors. Performing an inverse DWT on the manipulatedd1 vector while
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retaining the remaining vector has an effect similar to interchanging the packets in the
time domain. This is graphically depicted in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of the first three detail vectors for the four-level Haar Discrete
Wavelet Transform using time differentials as inputs.
4.2 Algorithm Development
4.2.1 Frame Length. The discrete wavelet transform vectord1 contains exactly
half the number of values as the input vector. Thus, at most the watermark algorithm
encodes half of the number of bits selected for the frame sizeparameter. To use an 8-bit
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Figure 4.2: A graphical illustration of the watermark applied to a sequence of time packets.
A sign change in thed1 vector appears like two timestamps changed places in time.
watermark, the frame needs to be at least 2n wheren is an integer greater than three. The
transform relies on an accurate synchronization of the frame because the transform
generates the vector values based on the diff rential time pairs. If even one timestamp is
lost, all differential time pairs are modified from that point until the endof the frame. This
requires that the frame is tightly synchronized and that anylosses or errors are identified
and corrected quickly. The requirement leads to the generation of the synchronization
frame for each watermark. Although this data is redundant, it allows for identification and
in some cases correction of errors in the presence of networknoise and packet loss.
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4.2.2 Synchronization Frame.The algorithm is also dependent on the choice of
the synchronization frame. Because the watermarker and the de ector need to use the same
value in the synchronization frame, the system is labeled assemi-blind. The discoveries
during the experimental runs show the characteristics of a synchronization frame that is
more robust than others. First, if the synchronization frame is 8 bits, then the two four bit
words should be different. The reason for incorrectly identifying the synchronization
frame in these cases is due to the random watermark. If the synchro ization frame
contains bits ABCDABCD, the detector is more likely to incorrectly identify the
synchronization frame if the watermark contains the same word in the first or second
positions. In other words, if one word of the randomly chosenwatermark matches the
synchronization frame (i.e., ABCDEFGH or EFGHABCD), the detector incorrectly
identifies more synchronization frames than is predicted atrandom. In addition, the
synchronization frame should contain an equal number of 1 and 0 bits. This retains the
original distribution centered around zero of the Haar vector d1. The chosen
synchronization frame for the experiment is 1100 1010.
4.2.3 Frame Size.The DWT requirement of 2n values per frame requires the
encoding of 8 bits to have a frame size of 8× n wheren is an integer greater than 1. The
larger frame size encodes the synchronization or watermarkas ows of 8 inside the larger
frame vector. Increasing the frame from 16 to 32 values does nt increase the detector
performance in terms of speed or accuracy. In fact, in some cas s the 32 value frame
makes it less resilient to errors that occur near the beginning of the frame. Assuming that
the errors occur at random, the 32 value frame does not pose anadv tage over the 16
value frame. Pilot studies indicate that the 32 value frame does not offer a significant
performance improvement over the 16 value frame. In a physical implementation, it is
also more difficult to modify a larger frame size because of buffering. For these reasons,
the live experiment only uses a frame size of 16 to increase the resiliency to lost packets.
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4.2.4 Threshold. To detect the presence of the watermark using a semi-blind
detector, a calculation needs to be made to determine if a waterm rk is present. The
technique requires the synchronization frame to be sent prior to each watermark. The
presence of the synchronization frame preceding each waterm rk combined with the
distribution of the Haard1 vector allows the threshold to be a direct calculation of the
number of synchronization frames detected. Assuming that anon-watermarked streamd1
vector follows the distribution given in Figure 4.1, the likelihood that the detector will find
a synchronization frame at random is evaluated in Equation 4.2, whereT is the bit
detection level for an 8 bit synchronization value. The bit threshold is best described as
the number of accepted bit errors for the detector to correctly identify the synchronization
frame. Note that settingT = 0 means a synchronization frame is recorded only when all
eight bits are correctly detected as in,
P(T) =
T
∑
0
(
8
8− T
)(0.5)8−T(0.5)T . (4.2)
For T = 0, the chance of a synchronization frame exactly occurring is 0.0039. When
T = 1 for use in noisy environments, the probability increases from the zero bit value by a
factor of 10 to 0.03516. These analytical thresholds are confirmed using 60 unique time
differential arrays of over 3,000 data points. The number of times th previous
synchronization frame exactly occurs (T = 0) is 0.0038832 (i.e., 1563 occurrences in
402500 unique 16 value frames). SettingT = 1 also yields similar results with a
probability of 0.035098 (i.e., 14127 correct in 402,500 uniq e 16 value frames).
4.3 Watermark Application and Invisibility
A density plot in Figure 4.3 shows an unmarked sample, the same sa ple after
watermarking and the watermarked sample with noise added. In this case, the additive
noise is the maximum 12 ms and demonstrates a significant difference between the
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original and watermarked sample. It also shows how closely the watermarked sample
resembles the unmarked sample. This is due to the algorithm shifting the inter-packet
delays and its ability to preserve nearly all of the inter-arriv l densities. The only time
differentials that change from the original are those in which the negative watermarker
output is changed to the absolute value. This occurs in less than 0.1% of the total number
of packets. The detector is still able to correctly extract the data encoded in the
watermarked stream with additive noise as shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Density plot illustrating the unmarked, waterma ked and watermarked sample
with simulated noise.
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4.4 Simulation
4.4.1 Pilot Studies. The pilot studies using the R simulation show that the frame
size of 16 is more optimal for the detector. By reducing the frame size to the smallest
value allowable while encoding 8 bits, the number of synchronization frames increases
and enables the detector to more accurately decode the watermarks.
4.4.2 Threshold determination.The ability to determine if a watermark is present
depends on a suitable choice for the thresholdγ. In this case,γ is not analytically
determined, but experimentally derived by the distribution of the watermarked and
unmarked data in the presence of noise. The output of the simulation determines that the
95% quantile is approximately the point at whichγ is equal for the unmarked and the
marked statistics. For the purposes of this experiment, the95% quantile for the unmarked
data statistic is 0.01042 and the 5% quantile for the watermarked data statistic is 0.01045.
The actual threshold lies between these two points, and for the purposes of this
experiment, the mean of the two values is used in whichγ = 0.01043. Note, future
research may be able to analytically derive this value basedon the rate of traffic as well as
the statistical properties of the DWT vectord1.
The watermark estimated probability densities are shown inFigure 4.4. The
threshold value ofγ = 0.01043 is also shown. Note that these densities are estimated
using a kernel smoothing function and scaled to appear on thesam graph. This causes the
threshold to appear at a higher value than when the two densities cross on the graph. Also,
the watermark statistic must be positive although this graph depicts otherwise because the
density is only estimated.
4.4.3 Performance of the system.The simulation randomly selects a CAIDA 2009
extracted dataset and randomly applies network jitter before applying the detection
algorithm. The system then tests for the presence of a watermrk in these streams and
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Figure 4.4: Density plot illustrating the estimated probability distributions of the watermark
statistic. The threshold ofγ = 0.01043 is also shown.
unmarked streams. The results show that using the thresholdγ = 0.01043 at a 95%
confidence level, the FP rate is 4.6-5.1%, FN rate is 3.96-4.44%, and the error rate in
which the extracted watermark is incorrect is 7.86-8.30%.
4.4.4 Comparative Analysis.The simulation also validates the data rates
compared to the previous research. Using the 60 Houmansadr samples, the error rates are
drastically lower than using the 99 extracted CAIDA streams.In the simulation, the 60
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samples produce similar results using comparable amounts of etwork jitter. In the case of
the SWIRL test, live jitter values results with a standard deviation of 6.2-12 ms are
replicated in the simulation. For this research, instead ofusing previously recorded values,
the jitter is simulated as a Gaussian random variable with a me n of zero and standard
deviation of 6.2-12 ms. In the case of the DWT design, the errorrate in which the
extracted watermark is incorrect is 1.57-2.97 per 10,000 ata 95% confidence. The FN rate
using the Houmansadr samples is 7.8-8.4 errors per 1,000 samples, which is greater than
the SWIRL rate of 10−6. The FP rate of the simulation is closer to the SWIRL system with
a rate of 0-7 errors in 100,000 samples. The results of the simulation using Houmansadr’s
values demonstrate a response in concordance with previousresearch.
Using alternate data by synthesizing streams based on the tcplib distribution also
validates the performance of the algorithm. In this scenario, the simulation randomly
generates 120 second timestreams using the tcplib distribution and determines the
performance. Randomly selecting the 6.2-12 ms jitter, the wat rmark extraction error rate
for the tcplib distribution is 6.97-7.28% at a 95% confidencelevel. This matches very
closely with the simulated values from the CAIDA 2009 extracted dataset thus further
validating both the simulation results and the accuracy of the CAIDA 2009 extracted
timestamps.
4.5 Live Experiment Results
The results show that the watermarked data is more difficult to discern from
unmarked data as the traffic traverses more paths. This follows intuitive knowledge that as
the path gets increasingly noisy, the calculated statisticdraws closer to the thresholdγ and
becomes more like the unmarked data. Sending the data from California through Tokyo,
Ireland and Oregon before the server receives it in Virginiaadds additional network noise
such as jitter, thus generating more errors.
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4.5.1 Watermark Statistic Analysis.To determine whether a watermark is present,
the detector calculates the valueγ by analyzing the number of synchronization frames
present and dividing it by the total number of frames. In the case of a perfect network path
with no noise, the number of synchronization frames will be exactly half of the number of
total frames in the stream. For unmarked streams, the threshold will be closer to that
determined using Equation 4.2 depending on the bit threshold. For a bit threshold of zero,
the synchronization frame must exactly match and the unmarked statistic should be
approximately 0.003.
Figure 4.5 shows the density of the watermark statistics over the course of the
experiment. The unmarked streams to each target are groupedtog ther and closely match
the expected results in which the synchronization frame is dtected according to random
chance. The statistic mean for the watermarked streams increases as the target approaches
the final destination. The Tokyo server traverses the most connections and, as expected, is
less discernible from the unmarked streams. Likewise, sending traffic directly from the
California server to the endpoint (i.e., Watermark Virginiain Figure 4.5) generates
statistics with a higher mean than the other targets.
4.5.2 False Positives and False Negatives.The FP values occur when the detector
identifies the unmarked stream as containing a watermark. The results confirm the
expectation that the network path should not affect the error rates. Figure 4.6 shows the
density of the unmarked streams for each of the targets. The Wilcoxon test also confirms
that there is no statistical difference between the watermarked and unmarked streams.
The FN values behave much different than the FP. The FN values are dependent on
the network characteristics, while the results show that the FP values are not dependent on
the network path. The network noise alters the time delays ina manner that lowers the
statistic mean such that the detector fails to identify the presence of the watermark.
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Figure 4.5: Density plot of Watermark Statistics over all servers. Unmarked data from all
servers is grouped into unmarked values.
Excessive jitter, noise and delay are factors contributingto the FP rate. In the experiment,
the Tokyo server generates the greatest number of false negatives while the closest server
in Virginia generates very few. This is expected because theTokyo server traverses the
largest path from California through Tokyo, Ireland and Oregon before reaching the target
in Virginia.
4.5.3 Dataset Anomaly.In the case of the graphs depicted in this research, it is
important to identify and provide justification for an identified data anomaly. Figure 4.5
shows a small peak in the unmarked data at approximately 0.03. Figure 4.6 also shows
that this anomaly is present in datasets sent to all servers.Upon further investigation, these
data points originate from index number 99 of the extracted data. This dataset contains
56
Density plot of Unmarked Values, Threshold=0 
 Server Chain California −> Tokyo −> Ireland −> Oregon −> Virginia
Watermark Value
D
en
si
ty
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03
Target
Virginia
Oregon
Ireland
Tokyo
Figure 4.6: Density of Unmarked Live Experiments.
only 121 time differentials, resulting in a maximum of three synchronizationand data
frames to watermark. In this case, the unmarked data contains two frames of 16 that
contain the synchronization frame. This causes the detector to register the watermark
statistic unusually high for an unmarked dataset. It is important to also recognize that
although the unmarked data contains the synchronization frame, this does not result in a
lower detection rate when the same sample is watermarked. Inthis system, when the
synchronization frame is identified, the detector decodes th watermark in the next frame
and advances past the watermark frame to locate the next synchronization frame.
Advancing to the next frame prevents determining the presence of any additional
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Figure 4.7: Density of watermarked sessions during live experiment.
synchronization frames inside the current window. This causes a sample such as data
point 99 to appear to have a large unmarked value when the actual presence of a
synchronization frame across the entire sample is only 0.01867. This flaw in the
calculation of the statistic is also described in the futurework along with a
recommendation to correct for these unique cases.
4.5.4 Watermark Bit Errors. Another important aspect of the system occurs after
the detector threshold determines that a watermark is present. The extracted values should
match the code watermarked by the client in order to correlate that stream correctly. As
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expected, the Tokyo stream generated the greatest percentage of watermark bit errors and
the Virginia server contained the least. Figure 4.8 shows the histogram of the number of
bit errors in those incorrectly decoded watermarks. Based onthe results that most errors
were a single bit, some method of error correction in addition o the parity may enable the
detection and correction of these errors in future systems.
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Figure 4.8: Histogram of bit errors occurring during two trials. Only watermarked streams
with bit errors present are represented in this plot.
4.5.5 Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.The Wilcoxon rank sum test is conducted using
the statistic between the watermarked and unmarked data sets to measure the statistical
difference. The Wilcoxon test is used because the distributionsof the watermark statistics
are unknown. The two analyses determine the statistical differences between the
unmarked and the watermarked data and between the unmarked stream to the different
servers. The p-value of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the unmarked data against any of
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the marked sources is 2.2×10−16. Any p-value less than 0.001 indicates a sufficient
statistical dissimilarity demonstrating the difference between the unmarked data and the
watermarked data sent through any of the routes in this experiment.
Although there is a statistically significant difference between any of the
watermarked and unmarked datasets, the noise should not have a similar impact on the
unmarked data. When an unmarked stream is sent, the route and network noise should not
make the presence of a watermark any less or more detectable.A Wilcoxon rank sum test
performed on the four sets of unmarked data (i.e., Tokyo, Ireland, Oregon, and Virginia)
show that there is not a statistical difference between the unmarked data. Table 4.1
illustrates the p-values for each pair of tests.
Table 4.1: P-values for Wilcoxon Rank Sum test between unmarked datasets
Ireland Oregon Virginia
Tokyo 0.7818 0.7288 0.09962
Ireland X 0.4832 0.06921
Oregon X X 0.197
In addition to testing the difference between the unmarked and watermarked data, it
is also interesting to note that there is a significant difference between some of the
watermarked datasets. While the difference between sending the watermarked streams
through Tokyo and Ireland is not necessarily significant (p > 0.001), all of the other
datasets show a significant statistical difference based on the p-values (p < 0.001) in Table
4.2.
These results a statistical significance of the watermarkedstr ams exists between
servers. Although the original research goal is not locating the origin of the stream, the
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Table 4.2: P-values for Wilcoxon Rank Sum test between watermarked datasets
Ireland Oregon Virginia
Tokyo 0.1148 4.129×10−9 2.2×10−16
Ireland X 1.395×10−6 2.2×10−16
Oregon X X 3.642×10−6
p-values indicate a statistical difference between routes that traversed continents and those
that did not.
4.5.6 Results of five trials.Four additional runs establish a statistical basis for the
individual experiments. In each trial, three watermarked an one unmarked stream are
simultaneously sent through the network paths described prviously. Each run consists of
300 watermarked samples and 100 unmarked streams randomly chosen from the
previously used CAIDA 2009 dataset of 99 samples. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.9 show the
95% confidence interval for the watermark statistic, FP and FN rates in this experiment.
The results of the FP values demonstrate that there is not a sta istical significance
between the target servers as shown in Figure 4.9(b). Althoug the interval for the
Virginia is smaller than the other targets, it still falls within the interval of Ireland and
Oregon confidence intervals. This smaller interval is most likely caused because this path
includes no stepping stones and contains the least network noise.
Different from the FP rates, some of the FN rates are statistically different from each
other. As seen in Figure 4.9(c), the Tokyo and Ireland servers along with the Oregon and
Virginia targets are not statistically significant from each other; however, these two sets
are significantly different in the live experiment from one another. As these two datasets
are located on different continents, this provides evidence that the FN rate isd termined
by the watermark path.
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The accuracy rate in which the detector correctly extracts the watermark is observed
in five trials as well. Figure 4.9(a) demonstrates that extracted watermark accuracy is
dependent on the network path. Like the FN rate, as the numberof stepping stones
decreases and the network path is closer to the final target, the probability of an incorrect
watermark decreases. While there is not a statistical difference between the Tokyo and
Ireland servers, each of the other targets demonstrate a significantly lower error rate. The
additional network noise in the Tokyo and Ireland servers also increases the variance of
the watermark errors, generating a wider confidence interval.
Table 4.3: Five Trial data showing 95% Confidence Intervals for the extracted watermark
errors, False Positive rates and False Negative rates
Watermark Error Rates (%) False Positive (%) False Negative (%)
Simulation 7.9-8.3 4.6-5.1 3.95-4.44
Tokyo 16.6-26.0 4.22-9.77 5.16-10.04
Ireland 11.0-18.6 1.22-9.57 5.11-6.52
Oregon 6.8-8.8 0.07-7.67 2.91-4.02
Virginia 0.3-2.3 3.51-4.07 0.69-3.26
4.6 Validation
The final step of the analysis is to validate the results of theexperiment. The two
ways in which the data is validated is by comparing the simulated results to the live
experiments and comparing the results against other previous research.
4.6.1 Comparing the Simulated and Live Experiments.The data from the live
experiment closely matches the predicted data as shown in Figure 4.12. The unmarked
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Figure 4.9: Confidence Intervals for the False Positive, False Negative and Error Rates for
the five trials.
and the watermarked data follow closely the density for the live and simulated
experiments. The simulated data shown in black shows that the distribution of watermark
statistics are a close representative of the live experiment. Even the anomaly of dataset 99
63
Tokyo Ireland Oregon Virginia
0
2
4
6
8
10
Boxplot of False Positive Rate as a Percentage
Server
Fa
ls
e 
P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e 
(P
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
(a) Unmarked False Positive Rate
Tokyo Ireland Oregon Virginia
2
4
6
8
Boxplot of False Negative Rate as a Percentage
Server
Fa
ls
e 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
R
at
e 
(P
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
(b) Watermarked False Negative Rate
Figure 4.10: Box Plots of False Positive and False Negative rates expressed as a percentage
over five trials. Each trial represents 100 data points for unmarked streams and 300 samples
for watermarked streams.
referenced previously is shown both in the simulated and live datasets at a value of
approximately 0.03. The validation also shows that the simulated traffic is close to the
worst-case prediction of the Tokyo and Ireland servers. Thetraces that traversed paths
within the Continental US (i.e., California, Oregon, Virginia) have a mean value greater
than the predicted simulated values.
4.6.2 Detection Rates.The FP and FN rates shown in Table 4.3 also validate that
the detection rates of the live experiment are statistically similar to the simulation. The FP
detection rate confidence intervals all include the estimated 5% FP detection for the
CAIDA dataset. Again, this demonstrates that the unmarked data results are generally
independent of the target and number of stepping stones. TheFN rates and the watermark
extraction error rates vary more because they have greater dep n ence on the amount of
network noise. Both of these rates are within the range of the Oregon target, but the
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trials, 300 samples each trial.
Ireland and Tokyo targets show a greater FN and error rate than the simulation. This can
be expected as those targets contained multiple stepping sto es as well as greater
distances.
4.7 Analysis Summary
The initial simulation offered an analytical basis to set the threshold to determine if
the watermark is present. This value ofγ is set between the mean of the quantile which
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Figure 4.12: Density plot of Watermark Statistics over All Servers. Unmarked data from
all servers is grouped into unmarked values.
minimized the FP and FN rates at 0.01043. The live experimentruns of 300 watermarks
and 100 unmarked samples with a random watermark show very similar results to the
Tokyo and Ireland network paths. As the network path progresses closer to the
destination, the results show that the watermark is more discernible for the Oregon and
Virginia paths. The 95% confidence interval demonstrates a statistical difference between
the Tokyo and the Virginia network paths. The live experiments also show that the FP
rates are between 0 and 10%. This value may be lowered by changing γ at the expense of
less true watermarks detected. Currently, the FN rates are also between 0 and 10% but are
dependent on the network path.
While the detection rate is lower than other watermarking techniques, this novel
approach is valid, especially for human interactive network traffic in which the
inter-arrival of packets shows a high degree of randomness affecting thed1 vector. The
66
next chapter applies aspects of this analysis to real world scenarios and offers future
research ideas to improve this novel technique.
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Figure 4.13: Density plot separating Watermarked and Unmarked Simulated and Live
Datasets.
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5 Conclusions
5.1 Research Impacts
As the threat of attackers increases, better methods of identifying and detecting
malicious actors becomes more important. Using network stepping stones, these malicious
users are able to better evade detection and penetrate deeper into networks. This research
introduces a novel technique to detect network stepping stone using DWTs to embed a
watermark on the network packet timing. The detector is bestsuited for interactive
sessions normally generated by a human entering keystrokes. Although TCP packets are
used in this research, because the technique presented is indepe dent of the packet
payload, it can also be extended to other protocols (i.e., User Datagram Protocol (UDP)).
The simulation results demonstrate that the system accurately detects the presence of
a watermark at a 5% FP and FN rate for both the extracted timesta ps as well as the
empiricaltcplib distribution. The simulated system also extracts the corret 8-bit
watermark with a greater than 90% accuracy. Using sample datasets from previous
watermark research, the extracted watermark accuracy increases to 99.98% accuracy.
The live experiment demonstrates repeatable results usingreal-world hosts as
stepping stones. Five trials are conducted in which three simultaneous watermarked
samples and one unmarked sample are sent 100 times at each different target. The results
show that at a 95% confidence level, the unmarked samples are statistically different from
each watermarked stream. This provides evidence that in a live environment the technique
can detect network stepping stones.
The capability of the algorithm to function across large distances shows that it is
resilient to one of the more popular use cases of the steppingsto e. While previous
research demonstrates effectiveness using single stepping stones, this research achieved
the same capability using multiple stepping stones locatedin different continents. The
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statistical difference shown in the watermarked values between the servers allow for
further investigation as to the possibility that this technique can assist in geographically
locating a malicious host.
5.2 Attacker Defenses Against Algorithm
To find the stepping stones, the algorithm must be somewhat resilient against attacks.
If the attacker sees that a watermark is present, they may attemp to subvert or remove the
watermark altogether. Although this algorithm is subject to methods that reduce the
detection rate, the difficulty of detecting the presence of the watermark makes it less likely
the attacker will attempt them. Some of these attacks also assume that the attacker has
complete control over the stepping stones.
As shown previously, automated traffic does not perform well in this algorithm. If the
attacker cleverly devised a way to send the packets at a constant rate, the variance of the
d1 vector is not large enough and the changes by the noise overshadows the changes made
to the sign. Other constant bit rate traffic (i.e., VoIP) is equally difficult to detect when
tunneled through the SSH port .
Packet retransmission and packetization may reduce effectiveness with this
algorithm. As stated previously, if one timestamp is lost inthe frame, all values from that
point to the end of the frame will most likely be decoded incorrectly. The redundancy of
synchronization frames and smaller frame size (i.e., 16 values) provides some protection
against this attack, but are not entirely resistant. In addition, if the stepping stones remove
or add chaff packets, this also causes errors due to the missing timestamp. If the error
occurs only during the watermark, all values proceeding theerror will be decoded
incorrectly. If the error is during the synchronization frame, the results vary depending on
the bit threshold.
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Inducing random delay at any point after the watermark is applied also is a successful
attack on this system. Most of the utilities that retransmitpackets only apply constant
delay, thus as of this writing this attack needs custom written software to be successful.
Packetization also causes problems and is evident in some syst ms as shown during
the client development. If any system re-packetizes the packets after the watermark is
applied, this affects the inter-packet delay in the same way as if a packet is dropped.
Because the TCP connection is an atomic process requiring acknowledgements and
sequence numbers, most retransmission systems forward packets at the network layer. If
the retransmission program is written as a socket, this may become a greater problem as a
socket is more likely to combine smaller packets into a larger packet depending on the
network speed and operating system.
5.3 Future Work
5.3.1 SSH Traces.Although the CAIDA dataset provides a wealth of data, the
lack of payload presents the problem of determining whetherthe traffic is true SSH traffic.
Crude statistical analysis determines that some of these trac s are most likely not human
interaction. Indeed, an ideal dataset is actual traces froman SSH server. A honeypot or
captured traffic from an exercise may be beneficial to record timestamps usedfrom human
interactive sessions.
5.3.2 Algorithm Improvements.This algorithm relies on single bit parity to detect
a bad watermark after finding the synchronization frame. Error detection and correction
techniques such as Forward Error Correction (FEC) may enhancethis algorithm to correct
identified errors. The analysis shows that single bit errorsare the most common. A single
bit correction may drastically improve results, especially in noisy environments.
Another improvement relates to the watermark statistic calul tion. If a
synchronization frame is correct, this algorithm does not calculate the existence of the
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synchronization in the next two frames. In order to provide amore statistically correct
calculation of the watermark presence, the algorithm should iteratively calculate the
number of synchronization frames across the entire stream.This increases the number of
calculations performed and most likely results in performance loss; however, it reduces
the likelihood of the circumstance around data point 99 referenced in Section 4.5.3 from
occurring.
5.3.3 Stepping Stone Geo-location.As shown in the analysis, the experiments
demonstrate a statistical difference in the watermark statistic between the different servers.
The additional goal of geo-locating the source may be assisted by the use of a watermark.
In this case, the detector may be used to determine not only ifa watermark is present, but
estimating the traversed path. Future work using watermarks may assist the geo-location
of the client origin using only the synchronization frames.
5.3.4 In-Line Usage. The most difficult task of using the detector against stepping
stones is the ability to perform the watermarking on live data as it occurs. This may be
conducted either at the kernel level on the host device or by developing an in-line
watermarker that marks the packets as they traverse a network connection. In either case,
the system currently needs to buffer at least 16 packets before it can apply the algorithm
and send the packets. It may be entirely possible in the future to only buffer between two
to four packets and use this information on the following packets, but there always exists a
small number of packets to create the necessary inter-packet delays according to thed1
vector. Future analysis may reduce the amount of packets needed in the buffer, although
this delay may be one of the easiest ways for the attacker to identify the presence of a
watermarking device.
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5.4 Concluding Remarks
This research demonstrates a novel semi-blind active waterm rking method of
detecting stepping stones. The algorithm encodes the waterm rk on the first level detail
vectord1 DWT of the inter-packet delays. While other systems may perform better in
terms of FP and FN rates, the invisibility and scalability this technique offers presents a
unique advantage over similar active watermarking techniques.
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Appendix A: Client and Server Development
The development of the client and server reveal many challenges regarding the
design of a live watermarker. The issues documented here provide a basis for others
developing similar or future systems that require similar functions. While some of these
problems are platform dependent, many of the lessons illustrated here serve as a starting
point to a full scale live watermarker.
A.1 Client Development
The client development changed courses based on a few observations during the
experiment. The problems included socket streams issues, tran mission delays and low
level TCP programming development. The final client resolvedth se issues in a way
suitable for experimentation and analysis, but not for a finished product. To design a
product that is capable of manipulating the packet timings needs more effort and
expansion. This client only served to communicate with the designed server and send TCP
packets at precise time intervals.
Initially, the client used Python Socket library to generatthe packets at specified
time intervals. The Python socket library is robust at handling TCP sockets and provides a
very simple means to send the packets from a source to destination. However, with the
simplicity came problems as well. Because the socket is a strem oriented protocol, the
simple client packetized the data intended for separate TCP packets. Using the server to
record the timestamps did not reveal the problem because theserv r differentiates between
the packets by a sequence sent at the end of each packet. While the s rver showed the
timestamps correctly, the wireshark analysis critical to the experiment showed that the
client packetization reduced the total number of packets byas much as 20%. Because the
client repacketized small packets sent at high rates, if thepacket data was larger, it may
not be able to repacketize the data and force the client to send th packet individually.
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Using packet sizes of approximately 1050-1100 bytes of TCP payload successfully forced
the client to send each packet individually and prevented initial repacketization. This
introduced the problem of transmission delay. Because each pcket is now larger, it takes
more time to actually transmit the message on the physical mediu . Depending on the
host network speed, the observed transmission delay rangedfrom 100 to 200 msec.
Because of this delay, the only way to reproduce the necessarypacket timings was to add
this transmission delay to the original delay for each packet. This technique may be later
used in a store-and-forward type of implementation but was not the original intent for the
experiment.
The final client uses the Python Scapy module to generate and tr smit packets at the
link layer. The previous program correctly reads the delay times and sends the packets,
but the scapy module allows for fine control over the intervalbetween individual packets.
Using scapy, the client first generates a three way handshakenecessary for TCP and
continues to send data at specified time intervals directly to the network interface.
Because this experiment is not concerned with the receipt of the server echo replies, this
was removed from the server. This simplified the client because the TCP sequence
numbers only needed to be controlled from the sender. Using th s new implementation,
the client now sends the data at prescribed intervals and does not exhibit the packetization
problems described earlier. The sender needs to have an additional command to prevent
the kernel from closing the TCP connection. Because the kernelis ot actually initiating
the connection, when the low level packets are sent out, the serv r sends an
acknowledgement of each packet. When the kernel sees the acknowledgement, it will
send a reset to close the connection because the kernel did not initiate it. The following
command prevents a TCP reset command from leaving the client,although the kernel still
attempts to send the packet:
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags RST, RST
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--destination-port 5000 -j DROP
Using scapy to send the packets, the wireshark analysis shows t at the client is
sending each individual packet correctly and the server is also receiving each individual
TCP packet separately.
A.2 Server Development
The server responsible for collecting the timestamps needsto have the capability to
service multiple connections in a timely manner. The serverdo s not necessarily need to
reply to the client, but does need to acknowledge the packetsas they arrive and create new
sockets to discern the different connections. The Twisted Python module creates an easy
manner in which this can be done in a multi-threaded fashion to op imize performance.
Each connection generates a new thread handled by the server. Because the intermediate
clients change the original TCP socket from the client, thereis a need for the server to
parse the data from the client to determine whether a watermark is sent in the experiment.
In this experiment, the Twisted server searches the TCP payload and records the
connection and watermark to a file for later use. For unmarkeddata, the client sends 9999
9999 as the watermark denoting that there is none present.
Although the original client records the timestamps as partof the Python program,
this feature does not accurately measure the timestamps as they arrive to the server.
Instead, tcpdump is run in a separate process in order to capture the traffic as it flows to
the server. This creates the scenario in which the detector may be placed external to the
server and the dumped traffic may be analyzed using an external resource.
A.3 Intermediate Clients
The intermediate clients need to pass the data from one server to the next in order to
facilitate the daisy-chain operation of the stepping stones. Initially, the netcat program
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seemed to be an acceptable solution as a simple network relay. Observing the packet
timestamps from the server showed that the packets were arriving at the expected times,
but the wireshark timing showed otherwise. The main problemas seen previously is the
treatment of TCP packets versus sockets. In some cases, netcat would packetize the
smaller packets based on the TCP stream in to a larger packet which results in the loss of
the timestamp at the network packet layer.
The next solution focused on socat. This is a powerful tool capable of relaying
packets at many layers, including UNIX sockets. The following command relays the TCP
packets and did not show any packetization problems evidentwhen using netcat:
sudo nohup socat TCP-LISTEN:5000,nodelay,fork
TCP:next_relay_server:5000,nodelay
The only issue that socat showed is the duplication of the TCP source port. Socat
appears to use port 33800 as the initial source port in the TCP transmissions. Because of
this, each time the intermediate server immediately preceding the destination restarted, the
TCP source port restarted to 33800. This introduces problemsin the analyzer because the
timestamps are based on the streams that are identified basedof the tuple of source IP,
source port, destination IP and destination port. Section A.2 also mentions that this
problem is overcome by embedding the watermark informationin the TCP payload.
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Appendix B: Removed Samples
B.1 Non-Random Samples
The decision to remove samples is purely a subjective one based on the fact that there
is no information regarding the data payload to determine whther the traffic is true SSH
traffic. Other ports may conceal traffic on port 22, as well as SCP regularly copies files on
this port. This anomalous traffic removal is a manual process.
Most of the samples are removed based on two factors. First, many of the samples do
not appear random and appear more like traffic generators that have constant time
differentials. Examples of this traffic may include VoIP traffic, periodic maintenance and
probing traffic such as Simple Network Monitoring Protocol (SNMP). The figures below
represent the 180 streams removed for these reasons.
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Figure B.1: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.2: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.3: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.4: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.5: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.6: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.7: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.8: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.9: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.10: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.11: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.12: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.13: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.14: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.15: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.16: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.17: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.18: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.19: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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Figure B.20: Plot of Erroneous Port 22 Times removed from experiment
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